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Case No. 20090417
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Roger Howard Steele,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for wanton destruction of protected
wildlife, a third-degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the trial court correctly conclude that a fraudulently obtained hunting
permit is invalid and, therefore, cannot lawfully be used to hunt wildlife?
Standard of Review. Statutory interpretation is a legal question reviewed for
correctness. State v. Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, \7,

P.3d

.

2. Did the trial court properly include a mistake of law instruction?
Standard of Review. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. State v.
Powell 2007 UT 9,111,154 P.3d 788.
3. Did the trial court properly find that the delay caused by re-filing the
information was justified and did not violate Defendant's right to a speedy trial?
Standard of Review.

A finding of good cause is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. See State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, ^ 4,122 P.3d 561; State v. Coleman,
2001 UT App 281, t 3, 34 P.3d 790.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2 (West 2004) - Definitions;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 (West 2004) & (West Supp. 2007) - Fraud,
deceit, or misreprestentation in obtaining a license, permit, tag, or
certificate of registration unlawful;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-3 (West 2004) - Taking, transporting, selling,
or purchasing protected wildlife illegal except as authorized — Penalty;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4 (West 2004) - Wanton destruction of
protected wildlife —Penalty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2007, Defendant was charged with one count of wanton destruction of
protected wildlife, a third-degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4
(West 2004); two counts of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in obtaining a license,

2

permit, or tag, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5
(West 2004); and one count of failure to wear hunter orange, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 23-20-31 & 23-13-11 (West 2004) (R. 2-1). The
charges arose from Defendant's killing of a trophy deer in 2003 (R. 79).l
Identical charges had been filed in 2003 (R. 38). But, the original charges were
dismissed without prejudice on January 25,2007, after a series of continuances and
conflicts of interest arose when first one and then another of Defendant's privately
retained attorneys joined the Kane County Attorney's Office, the office prosecuting
Defendant (R. 2-1,38 & 34). After the original information was dismissed, a conflictfree appointed prosecutor reviewed the case and re-filed the information on March
28, 2007 (R. 2-1).
Defendant moved to dismiss the re-filed charges (R. 11-9 & 30-28). He
claimed that the statute of limitations barred re-filing of the misdemeanor charges
(id). He also argued that new evidence or other good cause was required to justify
there-filing (id). The State opposed the motion (R. 24-13). The trial court agreed
that the statute of limitations barred re-filing of the misdemeanor charges and
dismissed those charges (R. 39-33) (Add. D). As to the remaining felony charge, the
trial court rejected Defendant's speedy trial claim (id).
1

Recognizing that

Section 23-19-5 was amended in 2007. See Point I, infra. This brief refers to
the statutes in effect in 2003, at the time of the crime, unless otherwise noted.
3

appointment of an independent prosecutor eliminated all conflicts in the case, the
court found that this procedure was used "to ensure that the Defendant received a
fair trial with conflict-free counsel'7 (R. 34). The court also found that the resultant
two-month delay did not prejudice Defendant (id)2
Defendant then moved to quash and dismiss the felony charge (R. 57-50 & 4645). He argued that a fraudulently obtained hunting permit is voidable, not void ab
initio. He claimed, therefore, that the permit could be used to lawfully hunt, unless
and until the Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) discovered the fraud and
revoked the permit in an administrative proceeding (id.). Defendant, thus, claimed
that even if his special hunting permit were fraudulently obtained, it was still a
"valid" permit and rendered his killing of the trophy deer lawful, (id.).

After

construing the relevant statutes in harmony, the trial court denied the motion,
ruling that a "fraudulently obtained permit was invalid and could not be lawfully
used for hunting wildlife" (R. 80-75) (Add. B).3
In February 2009, a jury convicted Defendant of wanton destruction of
wildlife (R. 133-126). On May 8, 2009, the court sentenced Defendant to the
2

Judge Mower denied the speedy trial motion in a memorandum decision (R.
39-33). Defendant renewed the motion after Judge Bagley was assigned to the case;
Judge Bagley orally denied it (R. 101-99; R153:125). See Add. D.
3

Judge Mower denied the motion to quash and dismiss in a memorandum
decision (R. 80-75). Like the speedy trial motion, Defendant later renewed the
motion and Judge Bagley orally denied it (R153:173-175). See Add. B.
4

statutory term of imprisonment, but suspended the sentence and placed him on
probation upon certain specified conditions (R. 150-147).

Defendant timely

appealed (R. 145).
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4
Defendant admits he killed a trophy deer during a special limited hunt (R152:
56-57 & 62). He admits that only Utah residents were eligible to apply for this
limited hunt (R153:18-19 & 30; R152:41-43, 61 & 64). He admits that, as a matter of
law, he was not a Utah resident at the time he applied for the special resident permit
or when he participated in the limited hunt (R153:137-138).
Defendant admits that to qualify as a Utah resident, he was required to have a
fixed and principal residence in Utah for six consecutive months before he applied
for the special hunting permit (R153: 130 & 136; Exhibit 6). At trial, Defendant
testified that he carefully read this statutory requirement in the DWR Big Game

4

Consistent with well-established appellate standards, the State recites the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings and the jury's
determination of guilt. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, % 78,100 P.3d 1177; State v.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 2, 989 P.2d 503.
Contrary to these principles, Defendant makes no attempt to marshal the
evidence. See Br.Aplt. at 3-7 (reciting evidence that supports defense theory). But see
UTAH R. APP. 24(a)(9) (imposing on appellant requirement to marshal evidence
supporting challenged rulings); Chen, 2004 UT 82, % 76 (imposing marshaling
requirement whenever "the legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive/ 7 ).
Defendant's failure to properly marshal permits summary rejection of his appeal.
See State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17,124 P.3d 235.
5

Proclamation and, based on what he read, believed he qualified as a Utah resident
(R152: 41 & 61). Though he had lived in California for 20 years and worked, paid
taxes, and voted in California, he believed he qualified as a Utah resident because he
visited Utah for a few days at a time, he boarded two horses in Utah and, for a
short-time, his wife commuted to Utah a few days each month to complete some
college course work (R153:137-138; R152: 64-68 & 106-109).
The jury rejected Defendant's assertion of good faith and found that he
"fraudulently obtained the permit by intentionally misrepresenting himself to be a
Utah resident" (R. 124 & 126).
***

As a child, Defendant grew up in Payson, Utah; as an adult, he left the state as
soon as he could.
After he graduated from Payson High School in 1979, Defendant attended a
Utah college for one year (R153: 26-27). He then went on a religious mission (id.).
Upon his return, he moved to California to attend college (id.). He eventually
became an aerospace scientist and continued to live and work in California (R153:
29-34). He married and bought a home in California (id.). He and his first wife
divorced and he moved into a rented home in California, where he continued to
work (id.).

6

In 2001, he married Kerry Fannin, who lived with her parents in Payson and
attended a Utah branch of the University of Phoenix (id. & R153:102-103).5 After
their marriage, Kerry and her children moved to California to live with Defendant
(R153:100 & 104-106). She then attended a California branch of the University of
Phoenix, but in late 2001 and early 2002, returned to Utah for a few days each month
to complete some course work (R153: 88, 99 & 113; R152: 31-33). She graduated in
2002 (R153: 112). Defendant and Kerry separated in 2003 and divorced in 2004
(R153: 89 & 102-103).
Throughout their marriage, separation, and divorce, Defendant lived and
worked in California (R153:106-107). He occasionally visited Payson, where both
their parents lived and where they kept two horses (R153: 90,96 & 106; R152:39-40).
These visits usually lasted a few days and, in total, added up to "way less than ten
days" per year (R153: 85 & 96). Defendant had a California driver's license and
registered his vehicles in California (R153: 116 & 143-144). He filed income tax
returns and regularly voted in California (R153:116 & 139-141).
Defendant, however, loved to hunt in Utah. For years, he applied for Utah
hunting permits as a nonresident (R153:128-129). The selection of who received a
permit was determined by draw (R153:129; R152: 47-48). But even if not selected,

5

Kerry and both her parents testified for the State (R153: 83-118).
7

the applicant received a "bonus" point that could be accumulated and used in a
future draw to increase the chance of being selected (R153: 33-34). Over the years,
Defendant accumulated more bonus points than nearly anyone else in the Utah
applicant pool (R153:145-152; R152: 46-49). This placed him in "very rarefied air"
and made his chance of being selected for a hunt in 2003 very high (R153:151; R152:
49-50). Knowing he was likely to be selected, he chose to enter a special hunt
deemed the "Once-in-a-Lifetime Hunt" (R153:132; R152: 50; Exhibit 12).
The "Once-in-a-Lifetime Hunt" is a special one-week trophy hunt on private
lands in a Utah Cooperative Wildlife Management Unit (CWMU) (R153:18-22,73-77
& 129-130). The few applicants selected for this special hunt are provided a guide,
lodging, and food at no expense (id.). Only Utah residents, however, are eligible for
the expense-free hunt (id.). Nonresidents are prohibited from entering the draw, but
may privately purchase a CWMU permit (id.). CWMU private permits are limited
in number and prohibitive in cost (id.). A nonresident would pay $12,000.00 to
participate in the same weeklong hunt that the winning Utah resident could obtain
for free (id.).
In January 2003, Defendant applied for the special hunt by representing
himself as a Utah resident and listing his in-laws' Pay son residence as his own
(R152:40-43; R153:118,127-129 & 134). As he expected, given his bonus points, his
name was selected and he was awarded a resident permit for the special hunt (R153:
8

22-23 & 132; R152: 49-50). In September 2003, Defendant participated in the hunt
and killed a trophy deer (R153: 26 & 46-49; R152: 56-57). Afterwards, suspicions
arose that he was not a Utah resident (R153: 39 & 55-59). DWR was contacted and
Defendant was charged (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant claims that even if a nonresident fraudulently obtains a
resident hunting permit, the nonresident may lawfully use the resident permit,
unless and until DWR discovers the fraud and formally revokes the permit.
According to Defendant, because his fraudulently obtained permit was only
voidable, but not void ab initio, he lawfully used the permit to hunt in the "Once-ina-Lifetime-Hunt."
The trial court correctly rejected Defendant's argument. Under Utah law, an
act that is criminal and against public policy is void ab initio. Utah law deems it
illegal for a nonresident to purchase a resident hunting permit and for anyone to
fraudulently obtain a hunting permit through intentional misrepresentation.
Necessarily, such illegally obtained permits are void and cannot lawfully be used.
Point II. Defendant concedes that Jury Instruction 28A correctly states when
ignorance or mistake of law may be a defense. He, nevertheless, claims that
including a mistake of law instruction in this case was erroneous and misleading,

9

because his defense was not mistake of law, but good faith. The argument is
without merit.
Defendant testified that he carefully read the residency requirements in
DWR's Big Game hunting proclamation and concluded that he legally qualified as a
resident.

Given that testimony, the court properly included a mistake of law

instruction that correctly informed

the jury

that Defendant's

subjective

interpretation of the proclamation was not a defense.
Point III. The two-month delay in re-filing the dismissed information did not
violate Defendant's right to a speedy trial. The trial court properly found that
defense counsel conflicts of interest provided good cause for dismissing the original
information and appointing a conflict-free prosecutor, who reviewed the case and
re-filed the information.
On appeal, Defendant concedes that a two-month delay is not presumptively
prejudicial and, therefore, does not trigger speedy trial analysis. He suggests,
however, that another procedure, short of dismissal, could have been used to
eliminate the conflicts of interest. Defendant is precluded from making this claim
because his counsel stipulated to the dismissal below. In any case, Utah precedent
supports the procedure used in this case.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred in considering only the twomonth period between dismissal and re-filing and not the entire period from
10

original charge to trial. Because this issue is not preserved, this Court should not
consider it. Moreover, the Court could not properly evaluate this claim, because the
record of the original prosecution is not included. Alternatively, the trial court
noted that numerous delays in the original prosecution were attributable to defense
counsel. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge this statement or establish that it
is clearly erroneous. Consequently, on this record, there is no basis to find
Defendant's speedy trial rights were violated.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT A
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED HUNTING PERMIT IS INVALID
AND CANNOT BE USED TO LAWFULLY HUNT WILDLIFE
Defendant asserts that at the time of his crime a fraudulently obtained
hunting permit was voidable, but not void ab initio. See Br.Aplt. at 9-15. The 2003
statutes, in effect at the time of Defendant's crime, did not expressly state that an
illegally obtained hunting permit was an invalid permit. Compare UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 23-19-5 (West 2004), with UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 (West Supp. 2007) {Add. A).
According to Defendant, without such express statutory language, a defrauder can
lawfully use the fraudulently obtained permit, unless and until DWR discovers the
fraud and formally revokes the permit in an administrative proceeding. See Br.Aplt.

11

at 13-15. The trial court correctly rejected this argument (R. 80-75; R153: 174-175)
(Add. B).
Defendant was originally charged both with fraudulently obtaining a hunting
permit and wanton destruction of wildlife (R. 38). The trial court dismissed the refiled fraud charge as barred by the statute of limitations (R. 38-36).

Though

dismissed, the fraud allegation still formed the basis for the wanton destruction of
wildlife charge, in that the prosecution maintained that the permit Defendant
possessed was invalid because it was illegally obtained.
To convict Defendant of wanton destruction of wildlife, the prosecution was
required to prove that Defendant:
(1) violated UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-3(1) (West 2004), and
(2) killed protected wildlife, and
(3) did so intentionally, knowing, or recklessly.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4 (West 2004) {Add. A). See also R. 79 & 125. As to this
first element, a defendant violates subsection 23-20-3(1) if he possesses "protected
wildlife or their parts unaccompanied by a valid license, permit, [or] tag." See Add.
A.

It is illegal for a nonresident to purchase a resident hunting license or to

otherwise fraudulently obtain a hunting license through deceit or misrepresentation.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5 (West 2004) (Add. A). The trial court read these statutory
provisions in harmony to correctly rule, "a fraudulently obtained permit was
12

invalid and could not be lawfully used to hunt wildlife77 (R. 76) (Add. B). See State v.
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing related statutes "should be
construed in a harmonious fashion" and analyzed in light of statutes' overall
objective, intent, and purpose). See also State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, | 8, 63 P.3d
667 (directing harmonious reading of related statutes).
Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling is erroneous because, in his
view, unless the statute expressly declares that an illegally obtained permit is
invalid, the permit is valid until declared otherwise. See Br.Aplt. at 13-15. In
support, he cites the 2007 amendment to section 23-19-5 that added this express
language: "Any license, permit, tag, or certification of registration obtained in
violation of [the statute] is invalid." UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-5(2) (West Supp.
2007) (Add. A). Defendant notes that the sponsor of the 2007 amendment stated that
this express language was necessary to close a "loophole" that allowed an illegally
obtained permit to remain valid. See Br.Aplt. at 14 n.l. The trial court properly
refused to credit the sponsor's interpretation of pre-2007 law, because the sponsor's
statement "was not supported by any authority as there were no cases in Utah at
that time interpreting Section 23-19-5" (R. 76). Cf. State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App
511, ^ 41, 153 P.3d 804 (noting single legislator's comment usually not
determinative); State v. Hirschfelder, 199 P.3d 1017, 1025 n.13 (Wash. App. 2009)
(same). Instead, as will be discussed, the trial court correctly concluded that the
13

2007 amendment only made explicit what was already implicit in the 2003 statute:
an illegally-procured permit is void ab initio and, therefore, cannot lawfully be used
to hunt (R. 80-75) (Add. B).
Defendant further states that common law principles render "a legal right or
interest that is obtained by fraud or misrepresentation" merely voidable "at the
election of the party upon whom the fraud is practiced/ 7 Br.Aplt. at 9. Applying
these principles, Defendant argues that his fraudulently obtained permit was
voidable, but not void ab initio. Br.Aplt. at 9-11. The circumstances here, however,
are distinguishable because the challenged act (fraudulently obtaining a permit) is
an illegal act and offends public policy. It is well established that an illegal act is not
voidable, but void. See Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37,119,189 P.3d 51.
' T h e distinction between void and voidable is important, although the terms
are not always used precisely." Id. at f 18. The general difference between an act
that is void and one that is voidable is whether the act "offend[s] public policy." Id.
at H 19.
A thing is void which is done against law at the very time of doing it,
and where no person is bound by the act; but a thing is voidable which
is done by a person who ought not to have done it, but who
nevertheless cannot avoid it himself after it is done.
Id. at f 18 n.7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, when
a contract is obtained through fraud, its provisions are presumed to be only

14

"voidable unless they clearly violate public policy/ 7 or otherwise involve an act that
is "malum in se or malum prohibitum." Id. at ^ 21 & 22. But when the fraudulent
act is itself illegal, as in this case, it is a nullity and void: "Acts which affect
injuriously the public interest are generally void." See id. at ^f 19 n . l l (other citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
(defining void: "A contract is void ab initio if it seriously offends law or public
policy, in contrast to a contract that is merely voidable at the election of one party to
the contract"), cited with approval in Ockey, 2008 UT 37, % 19. n . l l .
Illegal acts offend public policy and adversely affect the public interest.
"[Enforcement of a state's criminal code constitutes a clear and substantial public
policy." Fox v. MCI Communications, 931 P.2d 857,860 (Utah 1997) (internal citations
omitted). "Most criminal statutory prohibitions provide narrow and clear-cut
definitions of a specific public policy designed to protect both society at large and
specific [groups or] individuals from antisocial acts." Id. For this reason, allowing
the consequences of an illegal act to be circumvented defeats the public interest. See
id. Yet, this is what Defendant advocates.
The wildlife statutes at issue here are designed to protect the State's natural
resources by regulating when and how wildlife may lawfully be killed. Requiring a
hunter to lawfully obtain a permit promotes this policy. Allowing a hunter to
benefit from an illegally-obtained permit circumvents this policy. In sum, precedent
15

and common sense support that an illegally obtained hunting permit is not a valid
permit, but is void ab initio.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INCLUDED AN IGNORANCE OR
MISTAKE OF LAW INSTRUCTION
Defendant concedes that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that
ignorance or mistake of law is generally not a defense. Br.Aplt. at 16 (recognizing
court's jury instruction tracts verbatim UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304 (West 2004)).
See also Add C (Instruction 28A). Defendant, nevertheless, claims that the inclusion
of this instruction was erroneous because the instruction may have misled the jury
concerning his good faith defense. Id. The argument lacks merit. 6
Defendant testified that before he applied for the resident permit, he read the
DWR Big Game Proclamation (R152: 41 & 61). That proclamation contained the
statutory definition of resident for purposes of the penal and administrative wildlife
statutes. It stated that to qualify as a resident, the applicant must have had his
primary residence in Utah for six consecutive months before applying and must not
have a resident hunting permit from another state (R153:130 & 138; Exhibit 6). See

6

This Court may summarily refuse to consider the merits of Defendant's
claim because he fails to marshal the facts that support the challenged trial court's
findings and ruling. Seefn. 4, supra.
16

UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2 (West 2004) (defining resident and domicile). See also
Add. C (Jury Instruction 29).
Defendant insisted that he had thoroughly read these provisions:
If you read the proclamation and you go through each of the
qualifications, I qualified.
(R152: 41).
I read that proclamation very carefully again and again to see if I did
[qualify as a resident].
(R152: 61). Defendant testified that after reading the proclamation, he believed he
qualified as a resident because (1) he visited Utah for a few days at a time, (2) in
early 2002, his wife commuted to Utah a few days each month to complete some
college course work, and (3) he kept two horses in Utah. See Statement of Facts, supra.
Defendant admitted that he did not qualify as a resident as a matter of law, but
claimed that any mistake he made was made in good faith (id.).
At Defendant's request, the court instructed the jury on the defense good faith
theory:
The defendant was entitled to rely upon the authority of the CWMU
permit unless he fraudulently obtained the permit by intentionally
misrepresenting himself to be a Utah resident.
(R. 124) (Add. B: Instruction 27). This instruction, in fact, provided Defendant with a
greater defense than he was legally entitled. It did not inform the jury that aside
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from fraud, it was also illegal for a nonresident to purchase a resident permit. See
U T A H CODE A N N .

§ 23-19-5 (Add. A).

After the trial court granted Defendant's request to include Instruction 27, the
court added Instruction 28A, the mistake of law instruction, at the prosecutor's
request:
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake concerning the existence
or meaning of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless:
(A) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed
his conduct did not constitute an offense, and
(B) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable
reliance upon:
(i)
An official statement of the law contained in a written
order or grant of permission by an administrative agency charged by
law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question; or
(ii)
A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion
of a court of record or made by a public servant charged by law with
responsibility for interpreting the law in question.
(R. 122) (Add. C). See also R152: 7-8,13-24 & 78-90.
Defendant claims that Instruction 28A "confuse[d] the issue that was central
to the defendant's theory of the case," because it unfairly suggested that he
misunderstood the law. Br.Aplt. at 17. He asserts that his defense was not mistake
of law, but good faith, that is, that he believed in good faith that he qualified as a
resident based on "the facts and circumstances of his and his wife's living
arrangements." Id. The distinction is without significance.
18

The jury was fully aware that Defendant claimed he acted in good faith in
applying for the resident permit.

And though defense counsel argued that

Defendant was not claiming that he misunderstood the law, Defendant effectively
testified that he did. Defendant testified that after carefully reading the legal
residency requirements in the written proclamation, he applied those requirements
to his own circumstances, and concluded that he qualified as a resident (R152:41,61
& 89-90). Instruction 28A correctly instructed the jury that Defendant's subjective
interpretation of the residency requirements was not a defense, unless his belief was
reasonably based on the official written proclamation or some other official source.
Moreover, even if the jury found that Defendant's subjective belief was
unreasonable, Instruction 27 informed them that Defendant could nevertheless rely
on the authority of the issued permit, unless the jury also found that he fraudulently
obtained the permit through intentional misrepresentation. In other words, the jury
was instructed that deceit was required for conviction.
Consequently, even if the mistake of law instruction were inapplicable, as
Defendant claims, its inclusion did not mislead the jury or affect the validity of the
instructions as a whole. See State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, \ 23, 219 P.3d 75
(holding single less-than-accurate instruction harmless when instructions read as
whole), cert, denied, 219 P.3d 75 (Utah 2009).
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT A TWO-MONTH
DELAY IN RE-FILING THE INFORMATION WAS JUSTIFIED
AND DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANTS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY
TRIAL
On appeal, Defendant contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated
because no new evidence or other good cause supported re-filing the information.
See Br.Aplt. at 18-22. The trial court properly found that defense counsel conflicts of
interest justified the two-month delay caused by the dismissal and re-filing of the
information (R. 39-33; R153: 25) (Add. D).
On appeal, Defendant concedes that the two-month delay between dismissal
and re-filing is not presumptively prejudicial. See Br.Aplt. at 21 ("Obviously, a delay
of only two months does not rise to the level of per se prejudice, nor is it
presumptively prejudicial.").

As discussed below, this concession defeats his

speedy trial claim.
Defendant, nevertheless, claims that the trial court erred because "[a]ny
conflict of interest [arising from his attorneys' new employment as prosecutors]
could have been resolved with the substitution of counsel/' Br.Aplt. at 19.
Defendant also suggests that the trial court improperly focused only on the twomonth period from dismissal to re-filing rather than the entire time period from
original charge to trial. See Br.Aplt. at 19-22. Neither claim has merit.
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The Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy trial is "generically different" from
other constitutional rights:
In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated
according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in
providing a speedy trial[,] which exists separate from, and at times in
opposition to, the interests of the accused.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972). Because some delays hinder and others
may benefit a defense, the extent of the right depends on the circumstances of the
individual case:
The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a
defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.
Id. at 522 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, courts
"cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to
be swift but deliberate/ 7 Id. at 521. Instead, an ad hoc balancing test applies "in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." Id. at
530. Four relevant, but not exclusive, factors are considered: "Length of delay, the
reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant." Id. "The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism,"
but "[ujntil there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
necessity for inquiry into the other factors." Id. "Closely related to length of delay
is the reason [for the d e l a y . ] . . . [A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should
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serve to justify appropriate delay/ 7 Id. at 531. Additionally, because a defendant
carries "some responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim/ 7 the court should weigh
"the frequency and force" of the assertion of the right and may attach little
significance to a "purely pro forma objection." Id. at 529. A delay that results in
prolonged pretrial incarceration or that significantly impairs the defense may be
prejudicial. 7 Id. at 532.
Defendant's concession that the two-month delay was not presumptively
prejudicial defeats his speedy trial claim at its onset. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530
(holding speedy trial claim must be based on presumptively prejudicial delay);
Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (same). Without a finding of presumptive prejudicial delay,
no further inquiry under Barker was necessary.
The trial court, nevertheless, continued its Barker analysis and found that
good cause justified the two-month delay (R. 36-34) (Add. B). On appeal, Defendant
attacks this finding by claiming that a substitution of defense counsel — rather than
dismissal and re-filing—would have eliminated the conflict caused when his former
attorneys became prosecutors. See Br.Aplt. at 19. As stated, this Court need not
7

"The standard for evaluating whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial
was violated under the Utah Constitution is similar to the federal standard," and
uses the Barker test "as a method to evaluate the totality of the circumstances under
the Utah Constitution." State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 708 (Utah 1990). In this case,
Defendant cites Trafny and other state cases, but does not claim that separate state
analysis or standards apply. See Br.Aplt. at 18-22.
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reach this claim; but if it does, the good cause finding is supported by the facts and
consistent with precedent.
Defendant was never detained on either the original or re-filed information.
Rather, he retained local counsel and continued to live and work in California
during the pendency of this case (R. 37-36, 29 & 22-19). Defendant's first retained
attorney withdrew after a few months (R. 36). Defendant then hired John E.
Hummel (id.). Mr. Hummel was subsequently appointed Kane County Attorney (R.
36 & 13). This was the office prosecuting Defendant in this case. Mr. Hummel
withdrew from representing Defendant (R. 36). Subsequently, Defendant retained
Mr. James Scarth (R. 36 & 13). Later, Mr. Scarth was hired or appointed as Deputy
Kane County Attorney (id.). Mr. Scarth moved to withdraw from representing
Defendant; but before withdrawing, Mr. Scarth stipulated that the best procedure to
eliminate the conflicts of interests would be to dismiss the case without prejudice
and appoint a conflict-free prosecutor, who could independently determine if
continued prosecution was warranted (R. 38, 36-35 & 13). The parties agreed that
the stated reason for the dismissal would be "insufficient evidence" (id.). But as the
trial court later found, it is undisputed that the real reason for dismissal was the

8

This Court also may summarily refuse to consider the merits because
Defendant fails to properly marshal the facts supporting the challenged ruling. See
fn. 4, supra.
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multiple conflicts of interest that arose after Defendant's two attorneys became
prosecutors (id.). Following dismissal, Scott Garrett, the Iron County Attorney, was
appointed as a special Deputy Kane County Attorney (R. 3). He reviewed the case
and then re-filed the information on March 28, 2007 (R. 2-1).
After the case was re-filed, Defendant moved to dismiss (R. 11-9, 30-28,10199). He claimed that the re-filing violated his speedy trial right because no new
evidence or other good cause supported it (id.). He did not challenge the dismissal
of the original information or claim that any delay in the original proceeding
violated his right to a speedy trial (id.). In denying Defendant's motion, the trial
court noted that the "numerous continuances" in the original proceeding were due
to defense counsel's multiple conflicts of interest (R. 34) (Add. D). Subsequently, a
different judge was assigned to this case and Defendant renewed the speedy trial
motion, without offering any new factual or legal arguments (R. 101-99; R153:122123). The new judge summarily denied the pro forma motion (R. 125) (Add. D).
The foregoing fully supports the trial court's finding of good cause.
Precedent also supports the finding. Utah has repeatedly recognized that conflicts
of loyalty arise when a defense attorney becomes a prosecutor.

See State v.

McClellan, 2009 UT 50, tlf 19-21, 216 P.3d 956 (adopting rule recognizing when
defense counsel joins prosecutor's office, entire prosecutor's office may sometimes
need to be disqualified "to ensure faith in the impartiality and integrity of the
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criminal justice system, and to prevent a chilling effect on a defendant's willingness
to confide in defense counsel") (other citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 856-857 (Utah 1992) (holding dual
representation of state and defendant jeopardizes 'Vital interests of the criminal
justice system"); State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, t 33,198 P.3d 471 (recognizing
disqualification "proper whenever the prosecutor has a conflict of interest with the
charges or the defendant"). See also UTAH R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.9(a) (prohibiting
defense counsel from engaging in the prosecution of former client "in the same or a
substantially related matter" without client's written informed consent). Moreover,
even if some method short of dismissal and appointment of a new prosecutor had
been possible, the parties stipulated to that procedure in this case.

Defendant

cannot challenge that choice now. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, *| 16,128 P.3d
1171 (recognizing affirmative representations of no objection constitute invited
error).
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by considering only the
two-month period of delay between dismissal and re-filing, rather than the entire
period from the original charge to trial. See Br.Aplt. at 19-20. This argument is not
preserved. In the trial court, Defendant argued only that good cause did not justify
the re-filing and its resultant two-month delay (R. 11-9, 30-28,101-99). He did not
claim that any other period of delay denied him a speedy trial. Consequently, the
25

issue is waived.

See State v. Patrick, 2009 UT App 226, | 15, 217 P.3d 1150

(reaffirming preserve or waive rule).
The issue is also not adequately briefed. See Kramer v. State Retirement Bd.,
2008 UT App 351, If 22,195 P.3d 925 (recognizing UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) requires
meaningful analysis). Proper Barker analysis requires examination of all delays
within the challenged time period. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-532; Trafny, 799 P.2d at
706-707. This requires detailed analysis of each delay, including the length of the
delay, the reason for it, which party requested the delay, and whether and how
strongly the defendant opposed the delay. Id. Here, Defendant does no more than
calculate the number of days that elapsed from charge to trial, without any analysis
of individual delays. See Br.Aplt. at 19-22. In addition, this record precludes
consideration of the claim, because it does not include a record of the original
prosecution so that individual delays may be analyzed and evaluated. See Gorostieta
v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, \ 34,17 P.3d 1110 (recognizing appellant's duty to provide
adequate record for review and, without adequate record, presuming regularity of
trial proceedings).
Alternatively, the claim has no merit. In its memorandum decision, the trial
court noted that the original prosecution had "numerous continuances due to
arising conflicts of interest" of defense counsel (R. 34). On appeal, Defendant does
not challenge this statement or establish that it is clearly erroneous. Consequently,
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on this record, there is no basis to conclude that the State unconstitutionally delayed
trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-532 & 536 (recognizing speedy trial violation rarely
occurs where defense caused or acquiesced in delay); Trafny, 799 P.2d at 707
(recognizing delay attributable to defense may not be assessed against State).
In sum, Defendant establishes no speedy trial violation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction for
wanton destruction of wildlife.
Respectfully submitted January 26, 2010.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

§ 23-13-2.

Definitions

As used in this title:
(1) "Activity regulated under this title" means any act, attempted act, or
activity prohibited or regulated under any provision of Title 23 or the rules, and
proclamations promulgated thereunder pertaining to protected wildlife including:
(a) fishing;
(b) hunting;
(c) trapping;
(d) taking;
(e) permitting any dog, falcon, or other domesticated animal to take;
(f) transporting;
(g) possessing;
(h) selling;
(i) wasting;
(j) importing;
(k) exporting;
(/) rearing;
(m) keeping;
(n) utilizing as a commercial venture; and
(o) releasing to the wild.
(2) "Aquatic animal" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(3) "Aquatic wildlife" means species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans, aquatic
insects, or amphibians.
(4) "Aquaculture facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(5) "Bag limit" means the maximum limit, in number or amount, of protected wildlife that one person may legally take during one day.
(6) "Big game" means species of hoofed protected wildlife.
(7) "Carcass" means the dead body of an animal or its parts.
(8) "Certificate of registration" means a document issued under this title, or
any rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board granting authority to engage in
activities not covered by a license, permit, or tag.
(9) "Closed season" means the period of time during which the taking of
protected wildlife is prohibited.
(10) "Conservation officer" means a full-time, permanent employee of the
Division of Wildlife Resources who-is POST certified as a peace or a special
function officer.
(11) "Dedicated hunter program" means a program that provides:
(a) expanded hunting opportunities;
(b) opportunities to participate in projects that are beneficial to wildlife;
and
(c) education in hunter ethics and wildlife management principles.
(12) "Division" means the Division of Wildlife Resources.

(13)(a) "Domicile" means the place:
(i) where an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal
establishment;
(ii) to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and
(iii) in which the individual, and the individual's family voluntarily
reside, not for a special or temporary purpose, but with the intention of
making a permanent home,
(b) To create a new domicile an individual must:
(i) abandon the old domicile; and
(ii) be able to prove that a new domicile has been established.
(14) "Endangered" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to Section 3
of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 *.
(15) "Fee fishing facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(16) "Feral" means an animal which is normally domesticated but has
reverted to the wild.
(17) "Fishing" means to take fish or crayfish by any means.
(18) "Furbearer" means species of the Bassariscidae, Canidae, Felidae,
Mustelidae, and Castoridae families, except coyote and cougar.
(19) "Game" means wildlife normally pursued, caught, or taken by sporting
means for human use.
(20)(a) "Guide" means a person who receives compensation or advertises
sendees for assisting another person to take protected wildlife.
(b) Assistance under Subsection (20)(a) includes the provision of food,
shelter, or transportation, or any combination of these.
(21) "Guide's agent" means a person who is employed by a guide to assist
another person to take protected wildlife.
(22) "Hunting" means to take or pursue a reptile, amphibian, bird, or
mammal by any means.
(23) "Intimidate or harass" means to physically interfere with or impede,
hinder, or diminish the efforts of an officer in the performance of the officer's
duty.
(24) "Nonresident" means a person who does not qualify as a resident.
(25) "Open season" means the period of time during which protected wildlife
may be legally taken.
(26) "Pecuniary gain" means the acquisition of money or something of
monetary value.
(27) "Permit" means a document, including a stamp, which grants authority
to engage in specified activities under this title or a rule or proclamation of the
Wildlife Board.
(28) "Person" means an individual, association, partnership, government
agency, corporation, or an agent of the foregoing.
(29) "Possession" means actual or constructive possession.
(30) "Possession limit" means the n u m b e r of bag limits one individual may
legally possess.
(31)(a) "Private fish installation" means a body of water where privately
owned, protected aquatic wildlife are propagated or kept.

(b) ' Private fish installation" does not include any aquaculture facility or
fee fishing facility
(32) ' Private wildlife farm" means an enclosed place where pnvately owned
birds or furbearers are propagated or kept and which restricts the birds or
furbearers from
(a) commingling with wild birds or furbearers, and
(b) escaping into the wild
(33) "Proclamation" means the publication used to convey a statute, rule,
policy, or pertinent information as it relates to wildlife
(34)(a) "Protected aquatic wildlife" means aquatic wildlife as defined in
Subsection (3), except as provided m Subsection (34)(b)
(b) ' Protected aquatic wildlife" does not include aquatic insects
(35)(a) "Protected wildlife" means wildlife as defined m Subsection (49),
except as provided m Subsection (35)(b)
(b) ' Protected wildlife" does not include coyote, field mouse, gopher,
ground squirrel, jack rabbit, muskrat, and raccoon
(36) "Released to the wild" means to be turned loose from confinement
(37)(a) ' Resident" means a person who
(i) has been domiciled m the state of Utah for six consecutive months
immediately preceding the purchase of a license, and
(n) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing, or trapping in any
other state or country
(b) A Utah resident retains Utah residency if that person leaves this state
u) to serve m the armed forces of the United States or for religious or
educational purposes, and
(n) complies with Subsection (37)(a)(ii)
(c)(i) A member of the armed forces of the United States and dependents
are residents for the purposes of this chapter as of the date the member
reports for duty under assigned orders in the state if the member
(A) is not on temporary duty m this state, and
(B) complies with Subsection (37)(a)(u)
(n) A copy of the assignment orders must be presented to a wildlife
division office to verify the member's qualification as a resident
(d) A nonresident attending an institution of higher learning m this state as
a full-time student may qualify as a resident for purposes of this chapter if the
student
(l) has been present in this state for 60 consecutive days immediately
preceding the purchase of the license, and
(n) complies with Subsection (37)(a)(ii)
(e) A Utah resident license is invalid if a resident license for hunting,
fishing, or trapping is purchased in any other state or country
(f) An absentee landowner paying property tax on land m Utah does not
qualify as a resident
(38) Sell' means to offer or possess for sale, barter, exchange, or trade, or
the act of selling bartering, exchanging, or trading
(39) "Small game" means species of protected wildlife
(a) commonly pursued for sporting purposes, and
(b) not classified as big game, aquatic wildlife, or furbearers and excluding
turkey, cougar, and bear

(40) "Spoiled" means impairment of the flesh of wildlife which renders it
unfit for human consumption.
(41) "Spotlighting" means throwing or casting the rays of any spotlight,
headlight, or other artificial light on any highway or in any field, woodland, or
forest while having in possession a weapon by which protected wrildlife may be
killed.
(42) ' T a g " means a card, label, or other identification device issued for
attachment to the carcass of protected wildlife.
(43) "Take" means to:
(a) hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, possess, angle, seine, trap, or kill
any protected wildlife; or
(b) attempt any action referred to in Subsection (43)(a).
(44) "Threatened" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to Section 3
of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 l.
(45) "Trapping" means taking protected wildlife with a trapping device.
(46) "Trophy animal" means an animal described as follows:
(a) deer—any buck with an outside antler measurement of 24 inches or
greater;
(b) elk—any bull with six points on at least one side;
(c) bighorn, desert, or rocky mountain sheep—any ram with a curl exceeding half curl;
(d) moose—any bull;
(e) mountain goat—any male or female;
(f) pronghorn antelope—any buck with horns exceeding 14 inches; or
(g) bison—any bull.
(47) "Waste" means to abandon protected wildlife or to allow protected
wildlife to spoil or to be used in a m a n n e r not normally associated with its
beneficial use.
(48) "Water pollution" means the introduction of matter or thermal energy
to waters within this state which:
(a) exceeds state water quality standards; or
(b) could be harmful to protected wildlife.
(49) "Wildlife" means:
(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp and crayfish;
(b) mollusks; and
(c) vertebrate animals living in nature, except feral animals.
Laws 1971, c. 46, § 2; Laws 1973, c. 33, § 1; Laws 1975, c. 60, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 102,
§ 1; Laws 1979, c. 90, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 112, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 115, § 1; Laws
1983, c. 123, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 76, §' 1; Laws 1991, c. 5, § 31; Laws 1991, c. 212, § 1;
Laws 1992, c. 27, § 1; Laws 1993, c. 234, § 15; Laws 1993, c. 307, § 1; Laws 1994, c.
153, § 29; Laws 1994, c. 208, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 211, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1996, c. 265, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1999, c. 209, § 1, eff. July 1, 1999; Laws
2000, c. 44, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2000, c. 195, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2001; Laws 2001,
c. 9, § 49, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2004, c. 66, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.
l 16 U SC A § 1531 etseq.

WEST 2004

§ 2 3 - 1 9 - 5 . Fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in obtaining a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration unlawful—Violation—Penalty
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, permit,
tag, or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. It is
unlawful for a nonresident to purchase a resident license. It is unlawful for a
resident to purchase a nonresident license. Any person violating provisions of
this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Laws 1971, c. 46, § 69; Laws 1975, c. 60, § 8; Laws 1979, c. 90, § 6; Laws 1986, c. 76,
§ 8.

WEST SUPP. 2007
§ 23-19-5. Fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in obtaining a license, permit,
tag, or certificate of registration
(1) It is unlawful for:
(a) any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;
(b) a nonresident to purchase a resident license; and
(c) a resident to purchase a nonresident license.
(2) Any license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration obtained in violation of Subsection
(1) is invalid.
(3) Any person violating Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(4) A fraudulent claim of residency in another state or country does not exempt a person
from the definition of resident in Section 23-13-2.
Laws 1971, c. 46, § 69; Laws 1975, c. 60, § 8; Laws 1979, c. 90, § 6; Laws 1986, c. 76, § 8; Laws 2007, c.
136, § 3, eff April 30, 2007.

§ 23—20-3. Taking, transporting, selling, or purchasing protected wildlife
illegal except as authorized—Penalty
(1) Except as provided in this title or a rule, proclamation, or order of the
Wildlife Board, a person may not:
(a) take or permit his dog to take:
(i) protected wildlife or their parts;
(ii) an occupied nest of protected wildlife; or
(iii) an egg of protected wildlife;
(b) transport, ship, or cause to be shipped protected wildlife or their parts;
(c) sell or purchase protected wildlife or their parts; or
(d) possess protected wildlife or their parts unaccompanied by a valid
license, permit, tag, certificate of registration, bill of sale, or invoice.
(2) Possession of protected wildlife without a valid license, permit, tag,
certificate of registration, bill of sale, or invoice is prima facie evidence that the
protected wildlife was illegally taken and is illegally held in possession.
(3) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(a) violates any provision of Subsection (1); and
(b) does so with criminal negligence as defined in Subsection 76-2-103(4).
Laws 1992, c. 27, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 211, § 24, eff. May 1, 1995.

§ 2 3 - 2 0 - 4 . Wanton destruction of protected wildlife—Penalties
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction of protected wildlife if that
person:
(a) commits an act in violation of Section 23-13-4, 23-13-5, 23-13-13,
23-15-6 through 23-15-9, 23-16-5, or Subsection 23-20-3(1);
(b) captures, injures, or destroys protected wildlife; and
(c)(i) does so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct as defined in
Section 76-2-103;
(ii) intentionally abandons protected wildlife or a carcass;
(iii) commits the offense at night with the use of a weapon;
(iv) is under a court or division revocation of a license, tag, permit, or
certificate of registration; or
(v) acts for pecuniary gain.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to actions taken which are in accordance
with the following:
(a) Title 4, Chapter 14, Utah Pesticide Control Act;
(b) Title 4, Chapter 23, Agriculture and Wildlife Damage Prevention Act;
or
(c) Section 23-16-3.1.
(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable:
(a) as a third degree felony if:
(i) the aggregate value of the protected wildlife determined by the values
in Subsection (4) is more than $500; or
(ii) a trophy animal was captured, injured, or destroyed;
(b) as a class A misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected
wildlife, other than any trophy animal, determined by the values established
in Subsection (4) is more than $250, but does not exceed $500; and
(c) as a class B misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected
wildlife determined by the values established in Subsection (4) is $250 or less.
(4) Regardless of the restitution amounts imposed under Subsection
23-20-4.5(2), the following values are assigned to protected wildlife for the
purpose of determining the offense for wanton destruction of wildlife:
(a) $1,000 per animal for:
(i) bison;
(ii) bighorn sheep;
(iii) rocky mountain goat;
(iv) moose;
(v) bear;
(vi) peregrine falcon; or
(vii) endangered species;
(b) $750 per animal for:
(i) elk; or
(ii) threatened species;
(c) $500 per animal for:
(i) cougar;
(ii) golden eagle;
(iii) river otter; or
(iv) gila monster;

(d) $400 per animal for:
(i) pronghorn antelope; or
(ii) deer;
(e) $350 per animal for bobcat;
(f) $ 100 per animal for:
(i) swan;
(ii) sandhill crane;
(iii) turkey;
(iv) pelican;
(v) loon;
(vi) egrets;
(vii) herons;
(viii) raptors, except those that are threatened or endangered;
(ix) Utah milk snake; or
(x) Utah mountain king snake;
(g) $35 per animal for furbearers, except:
(i) bobcat;
(ii) river otter; and
(iii) threatened or endangered species;
(h) $25 per animal for trout, char, salmon, grayling, tiger muskellunge,
walleye, largemouth bass, smallmouth bass, and wiper;
(i) $15 per animal for game birds, except:
(i) turkey;
(ii) swran; and
(iii) sandhill crane;
(j) $10 per animal for game fish not listed in Subsection (4)(h);
(k) $8 per pound dry weight of processed brine shrimp including eggs;
and
(/) $5 per animal for protected wildlife not listed.
(5) For purposes of sentencing for a wildlife violation, a person who has been
convicted of a third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a) is not subject to the
mandatory sentencing requirements prescribed in Subsection 76-3-203.8(4).
(6) As part of any sentence imposed, the court shall impose a sentence of
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days for any person convicted of a
third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) who captured, injured, or destroyed a trophy animal for pecuniary gain.
(7) If a person has already been convicted of a third degree felony under
Subsection (3)(a)(ii) once, each separate further offense under Subsection
(3)(a)(ii) is punishable by, as part of any sentence imposed, a sentence of
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days.
(8) The court may not sentence a person subject to Subsection (6) or (7) to
less than 20 consecutive days of incarceration or suspend the imposition of the
sentence unless the court finds mitigating circumstances justifying lesser punishment and makes that finding a part of the court record.
Laws 1992, c. 27, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 4, § 65; Laws 1993, c. 178, § 3; Laws 1995, c. 63,
§ 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 265, § 2, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2003, c. 125,
§ 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 148, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003, Laws 2003, c. 228, § 6,
eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 276, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER
ORDER AND DISMISS
INFORMATION

ROGER HOWARD STEELE,

Case No. 071600039

Defendant.

Assigned Judge DAVID L. M O W E R

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and
Dismiss Information. Defendant filed this Motion on March 3, 2008. The State filed its
memorandum in opposition on March 21, 2008. There was no reply from the Defendant. Oral
arguments on the Motion were heard on May 16, 2008. Defendant's Motion is now ready for a
decision.
DECISION
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and Dismiss Information should be denied.
ANALYSIS
Defendant is charged with wanton destruction of protected wildlife, a third degree felony.
The State alleges the following facts in support of this charge.
Sometime in January' of 2003, Defendant applied for a permit to hunt deer in Utah. On the
application, he stated that he was a resident of Payson, Utah at the time. He knew that he was not

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER ORDER AND
DISMISS INFORMATION, Case number 071600039,
Page - 2 a resident of Utah at the time of the application but chose to misrepresent this fact. Defendant's
application was successful; and he was issued a permit.
On September 5, 2003, Defendant went hunting with the permit. He killed a trophy deer
and tagged the animal with the permit.
The State must prove the following elements to successfully convict Defendant of wanton
destruction of protected wildlife. The State must prove that the Defendant (1) committed an act
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 23-20-3(1); (2) captured, injured, or destroyed
protected wildlife; and (3) did so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. See Utah Code
Annotated, Section 23-20-4(1). An act in violation of Section 23-20-3(1) is possession of
protected wildlife unaccompanied by a valid permit. See subsection (l)(d).
Defendant argues that a fraudulently obtained permit was nevertheless a valid permit.
Defendant claims that a permit would become invalid only when it was revoked through
administrative proceedings by the Division of Wildlife Resources. Defendant concludes that
bindover order should be quashed and the case dismissed because the State would not be able to
prove that his permit was invalid.
Defendant's main support for this argument is the 2007 amendment to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 23-19-5. This section makes it unlawful to obtain a permit by fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation. On April 30, 2007, this section was amended to make any fraudulently
obtained permit invalid.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER ORDER AND
DISMISS INFORMATION, Case number 071600039,
Page - 3 Defendant argues that the legislature felt the amendment was necessary because prior to
the amendment any permit obtained by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation was a valid permit. In
support, Defendant quotes Representative Richard Wheeler during the House Floor debate on the
amendment. Representative Wheeler commented as follows on the purpose of the amendment:
"[i]t is already unlawful to obtain a license fraudulently but that license is still valid, so it [the
proposed amendment] also makes the license invalid."
In addition, Defendant supports his interpretation of the licensing statutes by refererring
to Section 23-13-2(37)(e). This was the only section in 2003 that rendered a license
automatically invalid. Under this section, a Utah resident license was invalid if a person also
purchased any hunting, fishing, or trapping license in any other state or country. Defendant
concludes that since this was the only section rendering a license automatically invalid, a license
obtained by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation would not be automatically invalid.
The State disagrees with the Defendant's interpretation. The State argues that the purpose
of the 2007 amendment to Section 23-19-5 was simply to clarify what was already implied,
namely that a fraudulently obtained permit was automatically invalid.
The task before me is to interpret the licensing statutes, specifically Sections 23-19-5 and
23-20-3. The Utah Court of Appeals has given some rules on statutory construction in State v.
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313 (Utah App. 1993). These rules are as follows. First, the "terms of related
code provisions should be construed in a harmonious fashion." Id. at 1317, citing Grayson Roper

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER ORDER AND
DISMISS INFORMATION, Case number 071600039,
Page - 4 Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989). Second, the terms "should be
interpreted and applied according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary
meaning results" in an unreasonably confused or inoperable application or the one that
contradicts the express purpose of the statute. Id., citing Morton Int'l, Inc. V. Auditing Div. of the
Utah State Tax Comm % 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991). Finally, if there is doubt or uncertainty
as to the meaning, the statute should be analyzed "in its entirety" and "in light of its objective."
Id., citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991).
In this case, the statute is silent as to whether a fraudulently obtained license is or is not
valid. Thus, the best way to interpret this statute would be to analyze it in the light of its
objective and in its entirety.
In 2003, Section 23-19-5 made it unlawful to fraudulently obtain a Utah resident license.
Such behavior was punishable as Class B misdemeanor.
Defendant argues that using a fraudulently obtained license to kill an animal was lawful
in 2003 because such a license was valid unless revoked.
If Defendant's argument is correct, then using a fraudulently obtained license to kill an
animal would not have been punished at all in 2003. The only crime which could have arisen
from such a scenario was the Class B misdemeanor offense of fraudulently obtaining a license.
The more serious, felony offense of taking without a valid license would have gone unpunished.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER ORDER AND
DISMISS INFORMATION, Case number 071600039,
Page - 5 Such an interpretation of the statute goes against its purpose of deterring unlawful taking of
protected wildlife.
I conclude that in 2003, a fraudulently obtained permit was invalid and could not be
lawfully used for hunting wildlife.
Defendant urges me to rely on Representative Wheeler's comment about the purpose and
interpretation of Section 23-19-5. His comment alone is not enough to determine the state of the
licensing law prior to the amendment. The comment is not supported by any authority as there
were no cases in Utah at that time interpreting Section 23-19-5.
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and Dismiss Information should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover Order and Dismiss Information is denied.
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Special Deputy Kane County Attorney
82 North 100 East, Suite 201
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant
301 East Tabernacle, Suite 200
St. George, Utah 84770

(Jury out.)
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED OUTSIDE PRESENCE OF JURY
THE COURT: You may be seated.
DEFENSE MOTION TO DISMISS
BY MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, I think that it's,

ah, imperative that at this juncture I make a motion to
dismiss on the same grounds that were raised pretrial, and
that being that, ah, the statute in question, ah, did not
contain a provision that -- that rendered the -- the license
issued, ah, void ab initio at the time this license was
issued.

That statutory amendment was made in 2007.
Ah, it is our position that all the State has

established is the violation of this statute, which I believe
is 23 -MR. GARRETT:

Twenty-three, I think.

MR. PENDLETON:

-- ah, 19-5 --

MR. GARRETT: Five.
MR. PENDLETON:

-- ah, which, ah, makes it a Class-B

Misdemeanor to misrepresent your residency in an application.
Ah, and on the -- it's our contention that the license was not
void ab initio, and therefore they cannot -- they have not
established a prima facie case, and ask you to dismiss the
charge at this point in time.
THE COURT: Response?
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

1

BY MR. GARRETT;

Your Honor, this -- this very

2

issue, ah, was briefed by, ah, Judge Mower and he determined

3

that -- that, ah, a license that's obtained by fraud or

4

misrepresentation is not a good permit.

5

license, never was, and that -- that if we were only left with

6

23-19-5, as he's referenced to, that's a Class-B Misdemeanor,

7

we would not be able to prosecute on a more serious offense,

8

which is the wanton destruction.

9

separate elements and so it's not -- not a situation where you

It's not a valid

And -- and it does contain

10

have, you know, punishment - - a crime being punished by the

11

same conduct.

12

They are different elements.

And Judge Mower found that and determined that a

13

licensed --a license obtained by fraud is not a valid

14

license. And so I would just ask you to, ah, again it's the

15

same as the speedy trial. Res judicata should apply.

IS

already been, ah, ruled upon.

17

same ruling.

18
19

It's

I'd ask you to just issue the

COURT RULING
THE COURT:

I'm going to deny the motion for the

20

same grounds that, ah, Judge Mower denied the motion.

21

thought that that, ah, his analysis was correct and, ah, I

22

haven't seen anything new, and so I deny the motion on the

23

same grounds.

24
25

I

Ah, I also assert that as a matter of law of the
case, one District Judge should not overrule another one in
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
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the absence of something that is very egregious, and I didnTt
think that -- I thought that Judge Mower was correct, so I
deny the motion.
Ah let!s --is that the end of your motions?
MR. PENDLETON:

ThatTs the -- that's the only motion

that I have.
THE COURT: Okay.
Let's talk about timing.

Ah, Mr. Pendleton, what --

what do you anticipate your case will be and how long will it
take?

I guess my question is should we resume today or should

we let the jury go home?
MR. PENDLETON:

I would just assume a recess for

today and come back and present our case tomorrow and instruct
the jury and let them decide it.
THE COURT:

Do you have any objection to that?

MR. GARRETT:

No.

I think that's fine. We!re --

weTre not gonna finish up today anyway, even if he presented
his case.
THE COURT:
you the option now.

Right.

That -- that's why I'm giving

If I thought we could finish, I would.

MR. PENDLETON:

And I -- I suspect that, ah, Mr.

Steele will be on the stand an hour anyway, so it would be
5:30 by the time he got done, so -MR. GARRETT:

I'm fine with that.

I cleared my schedule.

I think Mr. Pendleton did,
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Addendum C

Instruction

T,

_^

Before you may fmd Defendant ROGER HOWARD STEELE, guilty of the offense of
Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife as charged in the Information, the State must prove
and you must find, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the
following elements:
1 (a)

That the defendant killed, captured, injured or destroyed protected wildlife without being
authorized to do so by wildlife statute, rule, proclamation or order of the wildlife board
OR

1 (b)

The defendant possessed protected wildlife or its parts without a valid permit
and

2

He did so with intentional, knowingly or reckless conduct
and

3

He did so on or about September 5, 2003, in Kane County, State of Utah
and

4

The protected wildlife was a trophy animal

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described
elements, you must find the Defendant not guilt of the offense of Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife as charged in the Information. If the State has proved, however, each and
every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is
your duty to fmd the Defendant guilty of Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife as charged in
the Information.

Instruction

PI

The defendant was entitled to rely upon the authority of the CWMU permit unless he
fraudulently obtained the permit by intentionally misrepresenting himself to be a Utah resident

vVA

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal
law is no defense to a crime unless;
(A)

Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did not

constitute an offense, and
(B)

His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i)

An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of

permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law
in question; or
(ii)

A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record

or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the law in question.

Instruction

You are instructed that "resident" means a person who (i) has been domiciled in the State
of Utah for six (6) consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a license or
permit; and (ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing or trapping in any other state or
country.
"Domicile" means the place:
(i)

where an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal establishment;

(ii)

to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and

(iii)

in which the individual, and the individual's family voluntarily reside, not for a
special or temporary purpose, but with the intention of making a permanent home.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION TO DISMISS
Case No. 071600039

vs.

Assigned Judge DAVID L. MOWER

ROGER HOWARD STEELE,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 11, 2007. The State responded on June 11,
2007. Defendant replied on July 5, 2007. Request to submit for decision was filed on July 31,
2007. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is now ready for a decision.
DECISION
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be partially granted as to Counts 2, 3, and 4 and
partially denied as to Count 1. Counts 2, 3, and 4 should be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
The following charges have been filed against the Defendant in this case: (1) Count 1:
Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, a third-decree felony; (2) Count 2: Fraudulently
Obtaining License, Permit, Tag or Certificate, a class B misdemeanor; (3) Count 3: same as
Count 2; (4) Count 4: Failure to Wear Orange, a class B misdemeanor. The information is dated

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 071600039,
Page -2March 28, 2007. The events described in Counts 1 and 4 happened on September 5, 2003. The
events described in Counts 2 and 3 happened in January of 2003.
The same charges were filed against this Defendant in case number 031600115. The
information filed in that case is dated December 31, 2003. Case number 031600115 has been
dismissed without prejudice by stipulation of the parties on January 25, 2007. The reason for
dismissal stated in the Order of Dismissal is "lack of evidence to prosecute."
A,

Counts 2,3, and 4
Defendant argues that Counts 2, 3, and 4 in this case should be dismissed because the

prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations in Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1302(l)(b).
Section 76-l-302(l)(b) provides: "... a prosecution for... a misdemeanor ... shall be
commences within two years after it is committed." The misdemeanors in this case occurred in
January of 2003 and on September 5, 2003, which is more than two years ago.
The State argues that the statute of limitation above is tolled because the Defendant has
been out of state almost the whole time since the commission of the offenses. The State cites to
Section 76-1-304(1), which provides that
[t]he period of limitation does not run against any defendant during
any period of time in which the defendant is out of the state
following the commission of an offense.
Defendant responds that there is an exception to this tolling provision. The exception is
that in cases where a defendant has an appointed agent within the state, the statute of limitations

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 071600039,
Page -3is not tolled as against that defendant.
Defendant cites several civil cases in support of this argument. Defendant says that he
had been represented by counsel virtually at all times starting on April 7, 2004. His counsel was
his appointed agent for purposes of the statute of limitations.
The phrase "defendant is out of the state" is not defined in Section 76-1-304. There are
also no criminal appellate cases defining the phrase.
In order to determine the true meaning of the statute, the Court must consider the
background and the purpose sought to be accomplished by it. Snyder v. Clune, 390 p.2d 915, 916
(Utah 1964). American Jurisprudence 2d explains the purpose behind the statutes of limitations
governing the actions against persons temporarily absent from the state as follows. This purpose
is

to protect plaintiffs from the possibility that they might not be able
to find absent defendants for service of process or obtain personal
jurisdiction over and compel defendants to appear and defend the
claim in the state.
None of the purposes described are of concern if a defendant has an agent appointed to receive
service of process on defendant's behalf.
Thus, it is logical to conclude that the presence of an appointed agent (counsel in this
case) does not toll the statute of limitations because the defendant would be subject to service of
process in the state and be compelled to appear in the state.
In case number 031600115, Defendant first obtained representation on April 7, 2004. His

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 071600039,
Page -4attorney withdrew on May 26, 2004. New counsel John E. Hummel appeared at the status
hearing on Defendant's behalf on June 18, 2004. Some time around September 8, 2005, Mr.
Hummel withdrew his representation. There is no formal notice of withdrawal. However, the
document entitled Second Certificate of Discovery Responses dated September 8, 2005 is
addressed to the Defendant rather than to his attorney Mr. Hummel.
On November 14, 2005, Jim Scarth entered his appearance on Defendant's behalf. Jim
Scarth withdrew from representation when case number 031600115 was dismissed on January
25, 2007.
New counsel Gary W. Pendleton entered his appearance on behalf of the Defendant in
this case on May 11, 2007.
Therefore, it appears that Defendant had counsel in Utah virtually at all times beginning
on April 7, 2004. This means that the Defendant was not "out of the state" and the statute of
limitations was not tolled.
Counts 2, 3, and 4 should be dismissed because the statute of limitations in Section 76-1302(l)(b)hasrun.

B.

Count 1
Defendant argues that Count 1 should be dismissed because it has been improperly filed

after dismissal in violation of Section 77-l-7(l)(a). Section 77-l-7(l)(a) permits further

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 071600039,
Page -5prosecution of an offense only if dismissal was on certain grounds. These grounds are: (1)
unreasonable delay; (2) the court has no jurisdiction; (3) the offense was not properly alleged; or
(4) there was a defect in the impaneling or the proceedings relating to the grand jury.
Defendant concludes that prosecution after dismissal in this case is not warranted because
the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. Lack of evidence is not a ground listed in Section
77-l-7(l)(a).
The State argues that subsequent refiling after dismissal due to lack of evidence is
permitted when certain conditions described in State v. Morgan, 34 P.3d 767 (Utah 2001) are
met. The following language from Morgan is helpful:
... after a magistrate has dismissed a charge for insufficient
evidence, state due process forbids refiling the same charge unless
the State "can show that new or previously unavailable evidence
has surfaced, or that other good cause justifies refiling."
At 770, Kll, citing State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).
The State in this case does not argue that new evidence has surfaced, rather it argues that
there is good cause justifying refiling. The State explains that the case was dismissed due to
conflicts of interest. Lack of evidence was simply cited as a convenient reason for dismissing the
case. The true reason was that both John Hummel and Jim Scarth were later appointed to be
Kane County Attorneys creating conflicts of interest with their former client the Defendant. The
case history in 031600115 supports this explanation.
In order to determine if this explanation amounts to good cause, the Court has to balance

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS, Case number 071600039,
Pace -6the prosecutor's right to freely prosecute and due process protections of the accused. Morgan, 34
P.3d at 770411.
Defendant raises an argument that refiling violates his right to a speedy trial as
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, Article I, \\2. To conclude that this right is violated, the
Court must examine the length of delay in light of the complexity of evidence, reasons for delay,
defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514,
530 (1972).
In this case, the delay is associated with numerous continuances due to arising conflicts
of interest. The case was continued to ensure that the Defendant received a fair trial with
conflict-free counsel. The Defendant would not suffer prejudice because the refiling occurred
two months after dismissal.
The State should be permitted to prosecute Defendant on Count 1. Count 1 should not be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is partially granted as to Counts 2, 3, and 4 and partially
denied as to Count 1. Counts 2, 3, and 4 are dismissed.
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MR. PENDLETON:

Your Honor, if I could just briefly

address that motion.
THE COURT:

You may.

DEFENSE SECOND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
BY MR. PENDLETON:

What happened in this case is

that Mr. Steele, ah, was charged back, I think, ah, on the
last day of 2 0 03, ah, with this offense and others, and then
he, ah, retained counsel.

He retained Mr. Scarth.

And that

case was pending until the end of 2 0OS, maybe -- maybe the
first month of 2 0 07, at which time Mr. Scarth accepted
employment in the Kane County Attorney's Office and, ah, could
no longer represent Mr. Steele.

And the Kane County

Attorney's office needed to make some other arrangements to
have a prosecutor, cause Mr. Steele was -- Mr. Scarth was
going into that office, and instead of just continuing the
trial and substituting counsel, they dismissed the case and
the case had to start all over again. And then, when it was
refiled, we filed a motion to dismiss on, ah, one of the
grounds being that — that Mr. Steele had been denied a speedy
trial and that everything, ah, all the time should be
calculated from the initial filing, ah, and should -- should
be -- that the State should be required to demonstrate some
legitimate basis for terminating the prosecution and then
trying to revive it.
And -- and I'm satisfied that -- that Judge Mower
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

addressed that issue and denied it on the merits, but out of
an abundance of caution. And then -- (Inaudible) - - a
conviction here, we want to be able to demonstrate that this
Court did have the opportunity to address that issue and could
rule on whether or not my client had been denied a speedy type
of a trial. And that's, ah -- that's all I -- that's the
reason I filed it again.
I'm not trying to just make more work or asking you
necessarily to revisit what Judge Mower's already said or
done, but I did want it to be clear when I filed my docketing
statement, if it gets to that point, that this issue was
raised and ruled upon.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Do you want to respond?
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE
BY MR. GARRETT:

Just briefly, Judge.

Ah, in my response I indicated that Judge Mower has
already ruled on this, this very issue, and so I think
there's, ah, you know, that res judicata issue where it:' s
already been ruled on and no need to rule on it again, ah, so
I would ask that -- that you rely upon that ruling from Judge
Mower where he, ah, dealt with that issue, denied that motion,
and deny it again so that we don't have a pending motion
before the Court.
COURT ORDER AND FINDINGS
CERTIFIED OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT

THE COURT:

I have looked at the motion and

considered it and I deny the motion.

The grounds for the

denial are this, that Judge Mower also or previously addressed
it.

I think under the law of the case doctrine, one -- one

District Court Judge should not overrule another, unless there
is substantial reason to do so.
I think that Judge Mower!s analysis was -- was
correct and I deny the motion for the grounds stated in Judge
Mower's memorandum and in the State's response.
Okay.

Let's bring back the jury.

(Jury in.)

PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT
THE COURT:

Go ahead and be seated.

Okay.

We are back on the record, following the break.
It's State of Utah vs. Steele.
Ah, Mr. Garrett, go ahead and I call your next
witness,
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you, Judge.

Ah, State calls Investigator Rawley.

(Witness

summonsed.)
EDWIN RAWLEY
called by the Plaintiff, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

Do you swear that the testimony you are

about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
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